Everything seems to indicate that President Erdogan has seen in Syria’s war an opportunity to solve a great part of the security problems that the country is facing. It’s logical that Turkey takes advantage of its demographic and military power, its privileged relations with the European Union, its belonging to NATO and its exceptional geographic location, with territories in the Balkans and the Middle East, and with access to the Mediterranean Sea, Marmara and the Black Sea. In fact, these geostrategic values make Turkey an indispensable actor in the region and NATO’s vanguard in such conflictive zones as Syria, Iran and Georgia.

The Turkish attitude in Kobane (Ayn al-Arab) strengthens the impression that Erdogan intends to take advantage of the occasion, to hit three birds in one stone.  Despite Obama’s efforts and the Turkish Parliament’s authorization to fight terrorist groups in Syria and in Iraq, the Turkish Army did nothing but closing the border and watching the development of the fights between the Kurds and the jihadists. Thereby, in addition to defending the national territory, they prevent the population of Kobane from receiving reinforcements and humanitarian assistance.  This attitude, that remained unshakable until the 20th of October, must not be interpreted as one of the many cases of inaction that are often given in the international sphere; on the contrary, it looks like a designed maneuver to provoke the weakening of the Kurdish position in the peace negotiations with Ankara. First bird.   

However, the Islamic State’s presence, along Syria’s extended northern border, could become a very serious threat for Turkey and could give a strong stimulus to the jihadist aspirations. In fact, Erdogan has not opposed the military participation in the USA-led coalition, he only put his conditions. The main one is that, among the objectives of the coalition, the overthrowing of Bashar Al-Assad must be included. The Turkish President is convinced, not without a reason, that the neutralization of the most radical rebels would strengthen the Syrian Regime, for that, he proposes that a unique integral strategy would be implemented against the Islamic State and the al-Assad Regime. Second and third birds.

Erdogan has tried to tackle his three objectives simultaneously, which forced him to undertake actions that ended up incoherent, for the least said. On one hand, the fear of a defeat of the Islamic State in Northern Syria, would reinforce his other enemies, is well articulated in the fact of Turkey having previously been the crossing point of which, thousands of combatants joined the jihadists ranks. In this sense, it could be believed that Ankara did not care much that the Islamic State took Kobane, since in that way Assad’s position would have been destabilized even more, preventing as well any attempt of consolidation of a Kurdish threat controlled by the PKK in Syria. Only Obama’s insistence made Erdogan partially modify his decision of safeguarding the border and allowed access to the Peshmerga, the security forces of the autonomous Kurdish region in Iraq, not that of the Kurds of Turkey.

Meanwhile, the Turkish passivity in Kobane has radicalized large sectors of the Kurdish minority that have been thrown on the street or have seized the arms. In that occasion, the reaction has been decisive and violent since the first moment, taking reprisals against the protests relentlessly and using the military aviation to bomb the PKK positions in Turkey; all that resulted in the death of tens of civilians and guerillas.

Erdogan’s decisions put in evidence that the rise of the Islamic State, though worrying, is not his main threat, nor the priority issue of his agenda. He does not, either, consider it a shared enemy that recommends the international coalition, not even cooperate but, to at least act in a coordinated way with Al-Assad and the Kurdish minority. On the contrary, Turkey is determined that the international community implements a global action to defeat the Islamic State and to overthrow Al-Assad. Moreover, to get involved with ground forces, it put as a condition, the establishment of a zone of aerial exclusion and another neutral or buffer zone, of course in Syria, which would disable many of the features of the PKK to negotiate with the Turkish government from favorable positions. Three in one.

Erdogan insists on disassociating the situation of the peace talks in Kobane, which Ankara keeps with the Kurdish Guerilla, but he chose to bombard them in Turkey and let the islamists punish them in Syria. Probably these actions make sense for internal consumption, but in the international sphere, Turkey is taking a lot of risks and can be left highly discredited. In particular, the measures taken until now would have dramatic consequences if the Islamic State takes Kobane and the killing of civilians occurs, as the United Nations Secretary General said in advance.  Therefore, it turns out extremely risky and complicated, almost impossible, to combine consistently the three objectives that Turkey has set. In order to achieve that, the international community should have to undertake a series of actions that in no way would be authorized by the United Nations Security Council.

Madrid, 29 October 2014