Failed states present severe disruption in the operation of their main constituents, namely sovereignty, population and territory, which result in a social, political and economic failure. Furthermore, these states are characterized by the inefficiency and weakness of their administration (sovereignty), the inability to provide basic services to citizens (population) and the lack of control throughout its geographical area (territory). This scenario is perfect for the emergence of high levels of violence, corruption and crime, since neither the security, the integrity of the individual, nor the prevailing rule of law are guaranteed and the state loses the monopoly on the legitimate use of force.

In many conflict areas the state administration is diminished, even subdued, by the action of insurgent groups. As mentioned above, starting from a position of inferiority, the insurgency seeks to snatch areas of influence and control the powers. It needs, therefore, to create scenarios in which state control can not be ensured and to that end, operates a wide range of tactics and procedures, among which there is always the use of violence.

It therefore seems logical that the nature, purpose and activity of the insurgency must have a direct impact on the feasibility of the states. To confirm the scope of this thought, a detailed study of the situation should be carried out focusing on both, the main failed states and the territories where insurgent groups have acted with greater virulence. Without going into greater detail, we could make a first approach to this issue by reviewing the failed states index.

The Fund for Peace publishes annually, in Foreign Policy magazine, the index of failed states. To prepare this ranking, they take into account twelve social, economic and political indicators that determine the degree of instability and violence risk: demographic pressures, refugees and internally-displaced persons (IDP), group grievances, human flight, uneven development, economic decline, delegitimization of the state, public services, human rights, security apparatus, factionalized elites and external intervention.

The existence of insurgent movements have a straight impact on two of these indicators, regardless of the indirect degree of influence they have on the rest. Thus, one of the sub-indicators of the indicator delegitimization of the state is the “Widespread loss of popular confidence in state institutions and processes, e.g., widely boycotted or flawed elections, mass public demonstrations, sustained civil disobedience, inability of the state to collect taxes, resistance to military conscription, and rise of armed insurgencies”. Moreover, the security apparatus indicator takes into account factors such as “Armed resistance to the governing authority, violent uprisings and insurgencies, proliferation of independent militias, vigilantes, or mercenary groups that challenge the state’s monopoly of the use of force”.

Reinforcing this argument, it is very instructive that almost all of the twenty states leading the 2012 index have been marked by the stigma of the insurgency. In particular, the four countries that top the list –Somalia, D. R. Congo, Sudan and Chad– have been continuously suffering the pernicious activity of very violent insurgencies. In Somalia, Islamist insurgency al-Shabab has controlled important parts of the territory for years; in Chad and Sudan, militias have caused a huge humanitarian disaster, resulting in the famine and the flow of hundreds of thousands of refugees; and in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda Christian insurgency Lord's Resistance Army and the rebel Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda sow death in neighboring territories outside government control. At the leading edge, the index also shows well known examples of countries hit by insurgent movements, such as Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Yemen, Nigeria, etc.

In summation, it seems reasonable to consider that, as a rule, the serious problems that characterize the exercise of power in failed states are strongly linked with the existence of insurgent groups. In this relationship the insurgency will often play the causal factor role in the deterioration of the state, while the rest of the time it will grow and develop, along with other violent expressions, thriving in the situation created by the weakness of the state.

Jaca 30^th January 2013