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Observatorio PSyD

The observatory says

28th of January 2013

Insurgency and Failed States (I)

Col. Francisco Rubio Damián
Commander ESP Military Mountain and Special Operations School

Over the last decades, insurgency has gained significant strategic importance and, in the opinion of many analysts, it will continue to be a relevant phenomenon, at least, throughout the first third of this century. ‘Insurgency’ is a very popular term that is often loosely used, and indeed confused with other terms such as rebellion, revolt, subversion, sedition, insurrection and even guerrilla.

The Merrian-Webster Dictionary defines ‘insurgency’ as a condition of revolt against a government that is less than an organized revolution and that is not recognized as belligerency. This definition provides key conceptual elements; ‘revolt’ and ‘government’ –or in other words, uprising and authority– but it is so generic that it becomes insufficient in order to properly unfurl the full strategic scope of insurgency.

The U.S. Department of Defense provides more specific definitional elements that help us frame the concept in question in the field of strategy. Until recent years, the U.S. joint doctrine (JP 1-02) considered insurgency to be an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict. Subsequently, it was preferred to associate the term with a specific use of violence, applying a similar approach to that employed in terms such as terrorism –use of violence– and terrorist groups –movement– The organized use of subversion and violence by a group or movement that seeks to overthrow or force change of a governing authority. Insurgency can also refer to the group itself” (JP 3-24 Counterinsurgency operations).

The U.S. Army and Marine Corps introduced in the definition an element as important as the ultimate purpose of seizing political power by the insurgents: insurgency is an organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control. (FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency).

Professor Jordan (University of Granada, Spain) gives an extended, very detailed and useful definition that completes the U.S. military doctrine: ‘Insurgency’ is an organized and enduring confrontation aimed to change a political regime, to control a specific territory, or to maintain a chaotic political situation, by means of an effective strategy for social mobilization and armed conflict where insurgents take, most of the time, an asymmetrical approach (Javier Jordán, “Las nuevas insurgencias. Análisis de un fenómeno estratégico emergente”. Anuario Español de Derecho Internacional A.E.D.I., vol. XXIV, 2008). A brief analysis of the definitions above shows, first and foremost, the strong relationship between insurgency and political power. There are several classifications that group the types of insurgency according to their nature and purpose. However, whatever the ultimate goal is, all types of insurgency are associated with the exercise of political power, either because they intend to seize established power or because they seek to maintain an anarchic situation in which insurgents can control areas of power or territories. Therefore the insurgency is domestic in nature, not international, and the insurgents lack the military capabilities of the established power (asymmetric approach). Another key feature of insurgency is its permanence. In order to have a chance of lasting, a social and violent movement needs to have adequate capacity for sustained mobilization, which inter alia requires an acceptable organization and some ability to join wills. In these cases, the vital factor for endurance is to achieve at least a minimal legitimacy through the support of the people and, if possible, in the international field. This complicates the creation and maintenance of an insurgent movement and it explains the high degree of failure in it. The means of action of insurgencies are based on violence, necessarily including armed resistance, although in most cases they also engage in methods of social confrontation. At least during the initial stages, insurgent groups try to avoid conventional warfare, preferring asymmetric tactics that, if proven successful, could evolve into a hybrid conflict in its final stages.

On the one hand, all of the above shows that insurgency and subversion are different in nature. Subversion is the set of activities aimed at breaking the stability of a political regime, characterized by a moderate use of violence. Subversion is, therefore, one of the means used by the insurgency to achieve their goals.

On the other hand, insurgency and guerrilla warfare are terms of a different nature, but may be connected. Insurgency could be an uprising or a movement and guerrilla warfare refers to a way of armed struggle, a way of combat that, moreover, can be used by insurgent groups, in the same way as they take advantage of other forms of action such as terrorism. In short, insurgency should not be identified with specific procedures or tactics, but rather with more or less popular movements that through various methods, which always include armed conflict, seek a power shift to their benefit. To do this, they make good use of subversion and, when appropriate, terrorist and guerrilla warfare, among others.

Insurgent movements are a major threat to international security, so they have become a significant actor in the world political order. Almost entirely, armed conflicts have ceased to be a matter of violent confrontation between national armies. In contrast, the protagonists are contenders of which at least one of them is outside the state sphere. Insurgent, guerrilla and subversive movements, militarized political parties, emerging nationalisms, religious, ethnic and tribal groups, terrorists, warlords, criminal organizations and even private companies make use of force in a more or less methodical way to achieve their goals and are the main cause of the current armed conflicts. Jaca 28th January 2013

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