Page O. Stoutland and Samantha Pitts-Kiefer, Nuclear Weapons in the New Cyber Age. Report of the Cyber-Nuclear Weapons Study Group, Nuclear Threat Initiative, September 2018.  

“In 2013, the Pentagon’s Defense Science Board conducted a major study of the resilience of U.S. defense systems to cyberattacks. The results were deeply unsettling: the board found that the military’s systems were vulnerable and that the government was “not prepared to defend against this threat.”1 In a successful cyberattack, the report warned, military commanders could lose “trust in the information and ability to control U.S. systems and forces.”2 The report made clear that “systems and forces” include nuclear weapons and related nuclear command, control, and communications systems. Military commanders could face false warnings of attack or could lose trust in their ability to control U.S. systems and forces. Let that sink in for a moment. The world’s most lethal weapons are vulnerable to stealthy attacks from stealthy enemies—attacks that could have catastrophic consequences. Today, that fact remains the chilling reality. Cyber threats are expanding and evolving at a breathtaking rate, and governments are not keeping pace. It is essential that the U.S. government and all nuclear-armed states catch up with—indeed, get ahead of and stay ahead of—this threat. In our efforts to reduce vulnerabilities and prevent a cyberattack with potentially catastrophic consequences, NTI in 2016 released Outpacing the Cyber Threat: Priorities for Cybersecurity at Nuclear Facilities. That report addressed the risk that terrorists or other hackers could sabotage civilian nuclear facilities, resulting in a release of radiation; hold a nuclear facility hostage to their demands; or even use a cyber breach to facilitate the theft of nuclear bomb-making materials. This new report, Nuclear Weapons in the New Cyber Age: Report of the CyberNuclear Weapons Study Group, addresses cyber risks to nuclear weapons systems and offers recommendations developed by a group of high-level former and retired government officials, military leaders, and experts in nuclear systems, nuclear policy, and cyber threats.

As we work to improve technical security measures, all nuclear-armed states should be asking some bigger questions. If ultimately we cannot be confident that systems will work under attack from a sophisticated opponent, and if we cannot have full confidence in our ability to control nuclear weapons systems, what does this say about the continued viability of nuclear deterrence? In an age of cyberwarfare, has the nuclear deterrence strategy that helped guide the West and the Soviet Union through the Cold War become dangerously obsolete? Should our nuclear policies and force deployments be changed to mitigate the potential consequences of cyberattacks? We believe the United States has an obligation to be a leader on addressing cyber threats to nuclear systems of all kinds, but especially to nuclear weapons systems. That is why this report is primarily U.S. focused. A subsequent effort will more directly address vulnerabilities in other countries because preventing nuclear use, whether by terrorists or by states, whether intentionally or by miscalculation, is a global issue. All countries with nuclear weapons and facilities must do more—much more—to protect their nuclear weapons and related systems. A weak link anywhere can result in catastrophe.”  

www.nti.org/media/documents/Cyber_report_finalsmall.pdf    


José Luis Masegosa, Claves del conflicto entre Arabia Saudí e Irán, Análisis GESI, 25/2018, Grupo de Estudios en Seguridad Internacional, Universidad de Granada (10/10/2018).  

“En este análisis nos proponemos identificar las claves explicativas de la rivalidad entre saudíes e iraníes que discrepan en muchos campos incluyendo la denominación del Golfo que baña su litoral, Golfo Pérsico para los iraníes y Golfo Arábigo para los saudíes. Este análisis se vertebrará en dos partes. En una primera parte nos dedicaremos a presentar el entorno envolvente de esta relación. 

Nuestro punto de partida es que la política exterior de un país responde a los condicionantes, presiones y oportunidades de su entorno tal y como son filtrados por las instituciones, cultura e ideología del país. Retrocederemos hasta 2001, el año que cambió el mundo después de los atentados de las Torres Gemelas. La reacción norteamericana afectó la relación constructiva que habían forjado Riad y Teherán durante la década precedente.

En una segunda parte, nos detendremos en los vectores estructurales de la relación: la distribución de poder en la región, el antagonismo ideológico, el sectarismo, los intereses divergentes de estas dos economías rentistas, y la percepción de amenazas.”

  http://www.seguridadinternacional.es/?q=es/content/claves-del-conflicto-entre-arabia-saud%C3%AD-e-ir%C3%A1n