Observatorio PSyD
The observatory says
15th of February 2018
Vanguardia de Ideas 16-02-2018
Isabel Adé Portero
Doctora en Historia Contemporánea
Moussa Bourekba (ed.), Atentados de Barcelona: reacciones, explicaciones y debates pendientes, CIDOB Report nº 2, Barcelona, Febrero 2018.
Resumen
“Los atentados de Barcelona y Cambrils cometidos los días 17 y 18 de agosto de 2017 (17A) sorprendieron a analistas y observadores, y no porque España no fuera susceptible de un atentado, sino porque estos se diferenciaban en ciertos aspectos de los recientes atentados perpetrados en territorio europeo. Tanto el perfil de sus autores como las reacciones suscitadas nos invitan a reflexionar sobre tres interrogantes: ¿Por qué ocurrió el 17A? ¿Quiénes son los responsables directos e indirectos de esta tragedia? ¿Cómo evitar que esto se reproduzca? Todas ellas son preguntas que suelen plantearse después de cada atentado terrorista, pero el 17A se diferenció por una cuestión fundamental: el carácter fugaz de los debates posteriores a los ataques.
Aunque parezca que la sociedad haya pasado página, el debate relacionado con los motivos por los cuales el grupo de jóvenes de Ripoll decidió matar a personas inocentes permanece abierto. Por mucho que avance el debate sobre los factores de radicalización, no existe a día de hoy un consenso en cuanto a la prevalencia de un factor sobre otro. Reconocer este límite metodológico representa, sin embargo, una oportunidad para los analistas, investigadores y decisores políticos: en vez de recurrir a patrones uniformes basados en experiencias anteriores, se trata de adoptar las aproximaciones multidisciplinarias que requieren los procesos de radicalización, cada vez más diversificados y multidimensionales.
En este contexto, Atentados de Barcelona: reacciones, explicaciones y debates pendientes, un volumen colaborativo de investigadores de CIDOB y otras instituciones, tiene como objetivo principal examinar los términos de estos debates. Solo de este modo se podrán imaginar estrategias comprensivas, creativas y adecuadas a cada contexto, para luchar contra una amenaza que, lejos de disiparse, sigue presente y en constante mutación.”
https://www.cidob.org/publicaciones/serie_de_publicacion/cidob_report/atentados_de_barcelona_reacciones_explicaciones_y_debates_pendientes
Shaiel Ben-Ephraim, “Is the Israeli Air Force Losing Its Edge?, Asia Times, February 11, 2018.
“Israel has been bombing targets within Syria with impunity since the country descended into a hellish civil war in 2011. The Israeli Air Force (IAF) has executed bombing runs throughout the region, even as far away as Sudan without suffering consequences for decades. It has taken its aerial superiority for granted and built its strategy on it. That made the events of Saturday, Feb. 10, 2018, all the more shocking for Israel.
An Iranian drone entered Israeli aerospace and was destroyed. Israel attacked the site from which the drone was launched. An Israeli F-16 fighter was shot down by anti-air missiles. The pilot and navigator parachuted (both survived but were injured) and Israel responded with its usual lack of subtlety, bombing targets in Syria and possibly killing Iranian soldiers.
Pro-Iranian militia Hezbollah hailed the downing of the aircraft as the beginning of “a new strategic phase” that puts an end to the violation of Syrian territories. […]
This latest incident may be a harbinger of a new strategic era in the Levant. The F-16 was probably shot down by a Russian made SA-5 Gammon medium-to-high altitude surface-to-air missile. Syria uses the missiles to cover an area in which Russian troops operate in support of the Assad regime. […]
Israeli officials continue to pretend that matters in Syria are under control, as the military referred to the operation as a “complete operational success.” However, they are either kidding the public or themselves. […]
If and when an open conflict between Iran and Israel commences, it would appear that the main Israeli advantage has been dulled. The war will likely involve Hezbollah firing barrages of missiles at Israeli population centers, daring the Israeli military to neutralize fire by sending ground forces into entrenched and booby-trapped positions primarily located underground. […]
The results would probably be even more gruesome for civilians in Lebanon and Syria who will be on the receiving end of the inevitable escalation of Israeli of military force. Like most people and actors, Israel is always most destructive when it feels insecure. It could also see Russia and the US dragged into a regional conflict contrary to their interests. Indeed, the changing military balance in Syria is bad news for everyone but Iran.
http://www.atimes.com/article/downing-fighter-jet-damages-israels-strategic-position/
Resumen
“Los atentados de Barcelona y Cambrils cometidos los días 17 y 18 de agosto de 2017 (17A) sorprendieron a analistas y observadores, y no porque España no fuera susceptible de un atentado, sino porque estos se diferenciaban en ciertos aspectos de los recientes atentados perpetrados en territorio europeo. Tanto el perfil de sus autores como las reacciones suscitadas nos invitan a reflexionar sobre tres interrogantes: ¿Por qué ocurrió el 17A? ¿Quiénes son los responsables directos e indirectos de esta tragedia? ¿Cómo evitar que esto se reproduzca? Todas ellas son preguntas que suelen plantearse después de cada atentado terrorista, pero el 17A se diferenció por una cuestión fundamental: el carácter fugaz de los debates posteriores a los ataques.
Aunque parezca que la sociedad haya pasado página, el debate relacionado con los motivos por los cuales el grupo de jóvenes de Ripoll decidió matar a personas inocentes permanece abierto. Por mucho que avance el debate sobre los factores de radicalización, no existe a día de hoy un consenso en cuanto a la prevalencia de un factor sobre otro. Reconocer este límite metodológico representa, sin embargo, una oportunidad para los analistas, investigadores y decisores políticos: en vez de recurrir a patrones uniformes basados en experiencias anteriores, se trata de adoptar las aproximaciones multidisciplinarias que requieren los procesos de radicalización, cada vez más diversificados y multidimensionales.
En este contexto, Atentados de Barcelona: reacciones, explicaciones y debates pendientes, un volumen colaborativo de investigadores de CIDOB y otras instituciones, tiene como objetivo principal examinar los términos de estos debates. Solo de este modo se podrán imaginar estrategias comprensivas, creativas y adecuadas a cada contexto, para luchar contra una amenaza que, lejos de disiparse, sigue presente y en constante mutación.”
https://www.cidob.org/publicaciones/serie_de_publicacion/cidob_report/atentados_de_barcelona_reacciones_explicaciones_y_debates_pendientes
Shaiel Ben-Ephraim, “Is the Israeli Air Force Losing Its Edge?, Asia Times, February 11, 2018.
“Israel has been bombing targets within Syria with impunity since the country descended into a hellish civil war in 2011. The Israeli Air Force (IAF) has executed bombing runs throughout the region, even as far away as Sudan without suffering consequences for decades. It has taken its aerial superiority for granted and built its strategy on it. That made the events of Saturday, Feb. 10, 2018, all the more shocking for Israel.
An Iranian drone entered Israeli aerospace and was destroyed. Israel attacked the site from which the drone was launched. An Israeli F-16 fighter was shot down by anti-air missiles. The pilot and navigator parachuted (both survived but were injured) and Israel responded with its usual lack of subtlety, bombing targets in Syria and possibly killing Iranian soldiers.
Pro-Iranian militia Hezbollah hailed the downing of the aircraft as the beginning of “a new strategic phase” that puts an end to the violation of Syrian territories. […]
This latest incident may be a harbinger of a new strategic era in the Levant. The F-16 was probably shot down by a Russian made SA-5 Gammon medium-to-high altitude surface-to-air missile. Syria uses the missiles to cover an area in which Russian troops operate in support of the Assad regime. […]
Israeli officials continue to pretend that matters in Syria are under control, as the military referred to the operation as a “complete operational success.” However, they are either kidding the public or themselves. […]
If and when an open conflict between Iran and Israel commences, it would appear that the main Israeli advantage has been dulled. The war will likely involve Hezbollah firing barrages of missiles at Israeli population centers, daring the Israeli military to neutralize fire by sending ground forces into entrenched and booby-trapped positions primarily located underground. […]
The results would probably be even more gruesome for civilians in Lebanon and Syria who will be on the receiving end of the inevitable escalation of Israeli of military force. Like most people and actors, Israel is always most destructive when it feels insecure. It could also see Russia and the US dragged into a regional conflict contrary to their interests. Indeed, the changing military balance in Syria is bad news for everyone but Iran.
http://www.atimes.com/article/downing-fighter-jet-damages-israels-strategic-position/
i._ade_16_02_2018.pdf
